c. To the Fundamental Reasons for the First Opinion

249. To the reasons for the first opinion [n.181].

α. To the First Reason

250. As to the first [n.182] I concede the first proposition, that “of one being there is one ‘to be’;” but the second, namely that “one ‘to be’ requires only one form” needs to be denied when taking ‘to be’ uniformly in the major and minor. For just as being and one are divided into simple and composite, so ‘to be’ and ‘to be one’ are distinguished into ‘to be’ of this sort and of that sort; therefore ‘to be’ per se one does not determine for itself a ‘to be’ simply, just as neither does any member of a division determine for itself precisely the other of the dividers.

251. In this way, there is one ‘to be’ of the whole composite and yet it includes many partial ‘to be’s’, just as a whole is one being and yet has and includes many partial entities. For I have no knowledge of this fiction that ‘to be’ is something that supervenes to the essence, and is not composite the way the essence is composite. The ‘to be’ of the whole composite includes in this way the ‘to be’ of all the parts, and includes many partial ‘to be’s’ of many parts or forms, just as a whole being that is made of many forms includes all the partial entities.

252. If, however, the force be altogether in the words, I concede that the total ‘to be’ of a whole composite is principally through one form, and that this form is the one whereby the whole composite is ‘this being’; but this form is the ultimate one, that comes additionally to all the preceding ones. And in this way is the whole composite divided into two essential parts: into act proper, namely the ultimate form by which it is what it is, and into the proper potency of that act, which incudes first matter along with all the preceding forms.

253. And I concede in this way that the total ‘to be’ is made complete by one form, which gives to the whole what it is. But it does not follow from this that in the whole there is included precisely one form, or that there are not included in the whole several forms, not as specifically constituting the composite but as certain elements included in the potential of the composite.

254. There is an example of this in a thing composed of integral parts: for the more perfect a living thing is, the more it requires several organs (and probably organs made distinct in species through substantial forms); and yet it is more truly one - by more truly, I mean, more perfectly, though it is not more truly one in the sense of more indivisible. For a truer unity and being are found with a greater composition in composite things than in the parts.

255. To the confirmation adduced from the Metaphysics [n.183], that chapter does not seem to be expounded well by Aquinas, as is plain in the Exposition I produced on that chapter;Scotus’ Exposition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 7 sect.2 ch.13 n.103: “One must note that those who deny the plurality of forms want to take their argument from this, that the unity of a definition comes from the fact that the genus is nothing besides the species of the genus, at least as to quidditative ‘to be’^” ²⁷ and the authorities verbally quoted are truncated and irrelevant to the minor premise [n.182, “one ‘to be’ is from one form”]. The first authority, indeed, is truncated, because the sequence is: “the genus is nothing beside what are the species of the genus, or if is indeed it is so as matter;” and the second part of this disjunction is true. Hence in favor of this second member he adds an example “voice indeed, as it is a genus.” It is the intention of the Philosopher, then, that what the genus imports is only that which is potential with respect to the species.

256. And in the same way, after “the final difference will be the substance of the thing and the definition” [n.183] there follows “in no way can one understand that the whole quidditative idea is the ultimate difference (for then the genus would be altogether superfluous in the definition, because the ultimate difference alone would express the whole essence of the thing); but one must understand it thus, that it is the whole substance of the thing as completive of it, in the way that the whole essence of what has the form is from the form that completes it.” For Aristotle himself assigns here the unity of definition in the same way as he said he put it first in Posterior Analytics 2.3-10; and the way that in Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-33 he assigns the unity of a thing, that just as there he says the composite is constituted of two parts (because “this is act and that is potency”), so here he says [7.12.1038a25-30] that one quidditative or defining concept is composed of two concepts, because this concept is potential and that actual. And just as act is more principal there than potency, and consequently is the more principal idea of unity as of being, so here too the concept of the ultimate difference, which is the more actual concept, is the more principal idea of the unity of definition.

257. As to what is added there [n.183] that ‘there is no order in substances’, [I wrote in my commentary Exposition on Metaphysics 7 sect.2 ch.13 n.108] that “it is nothing to the purpose; for immediately prior Aristotle has maintained [Metaphysics 7.12.1038a30-34“It will be plain if one transpose such definitions, as the definition of ‘man’ which says ‘a two-footed animal having feet’; for it is superfluous to say ‘having feet’ when ‘two-footed’ has been said. But there is no order in the substance, for how should one understand that the latter is posterior and the former prior?” ²⁸] that if there is trivial repetition when a prior difference is added to a later one, there will by parity of reasoning be triviality in the opposite direction; for there is no such order in the substances, that is, in what belongs to the substantial or defining idea of something, because different orders make and remove the triviality.”

258. As to what is added there [n.183], that ‘a lower difference includes a higher difference’, this is manifestly false:

Because then it would be impossible to define a thing through the proximate genus and the proximate difference, for the same thing would be said twice, namely the higher difference that is per se included both in the idea of the lower difference and in the idea of the proximate genus. Hence if one puts the idea of the genus and the difference in place of the names, the triviality manifestly appears. And this is the Philosopher’s intention in that place [Metaphysics 7.12.1038a18-35], how the triviality should be recognized in the definition, namely by putting the ideas for the names.

259. Nor even could a definition be given through the remote genus and several differences, because the same and proximate difference that divides the remote genus would be said several times in the many differences added to the genus. This result is plainly against the Philosopher in that same place [Metaphysics 7.12.1037b29-38a2], when he says, “Nothing else is in a definition besides the first stated genus and the differences. But there are different genera: the first genus and with this the exhaustive differences;” and he at once gives an example there: “as first ‘animal’, next ‘biped animal’, and again ‘non-winged biped animal’; and it is similar too if several differences are stated; there is absolutely no difference whether it is said through more or through fewer differences.” He means to say that a definition is nothing other than the first genus with many differences, and nothing other than the proximate genus and one difference, because the proximate genus is nothing other than the remote genus with many differences included in it; and both ways of defining would include triviality if a lower difference per se included a higher one.

260. As to what is added there [n.183] that Aristotle himself meant to say this -the authority “the cleaving of the foot into toes is a certain sort of footedness” is not to the purpose; for Aristotle’s understanding there is not about predication in the first mode per se [sc. when the predicate falls into the definition of the subject], of the sort which is understood through those abstract terms [sc. ‘cleaving’, ‘footedeness’], but that the lower difference should per se divide the higher insofar as it is such, and this per se division is made known through these abstract terms.

261. And that Aristotle does understand things thus is plain from what precedes, at the beginning of the paragraph, where he says that “one should divide the difference of the difference.” And he adds how he understands this: “not by saying ‘of what has feet, one sort is winged and another not-winged’, but that ‘one has cloven feet, and the other non-cloven feet’; for these are differences of feet.” And the passage cited follows: “the cleaving of the foot into toes is a certain sort of footedness,” that is to say, ‘cleaving of feet per se particularizes footedness’, and so it per se divides ‘having feet’, but ‘winged’ does not.

262. From the whole of this chapter [of Aristotle’s Metaphysics], then, if it is consistently expounded throughout, as it has been expounded elsewhere [Scotus, Exposition on Metaphysics 7 sect.2 ch.13], one does not get that the genus is nothing else per se in the definition besides the idea of the difference, nor does one get that the ultimate difference is the whole definition, or that it indicates the whole substance of the thing, or that there is no order per se in what is imported per se by ordered differences, nor that an inferior difference per se includes a higher. Nor does one get anything for the unity of form; rather the whole of that chapter is saved by positing a quidditative idea composed of an actual and a potential concept, and that the actual one is the more principal cause of the unity (just as one should say about a composite being as to its real unity, as he himself says in the Metaphysics [nn.255-262]).

β. To the Second Reason

263. As to the second reason [n.184] the response has been given [nn.243-244] that there is equivocation over ‘simply’ [sc. ‘being simply’ as opposed to ‘non-being simply’, and ‘being simply’ as opposed to ‘being in a certain respect’]. And indeed, as for ‘to give being first’, it neither belongs to every substantial form nor to substantial form alone to give ‘being simply’ such that quantity, if it were to come to matter first, could not give it formal being (though not first being) that departs from formal non-being; and a substantial form can come additionally to a second and third substantial form. But if one distinguishes ‘being simply’ from ‘being in a certain respect’ (as what is naturally first from what is naturally second), then every substantial form gives ‘being simply’ and every accidental form gives being not ‘simply’ but ‘in a certain respect’. You should not ask, therefore, if this form comes to that form first or second but, whenever it comes, what real act is it of a nature to bestow? The same sort surely as the sort that the form is.

264. But the two proofs brought forward from Physics 5 [n.184], about generation and motion, seem to contain a special difficulty.

To the first I say that ‘non-being’, when taken for the subject of generation, is taken there as privation, and the sense is: ‘what is generated is not’ (that is, what is the subject of generation lacks ‘being simply’); but ‘what is moved is’ (that is, as subject to motion it does not lack some ‘being simply’).

265. And if you argue that therefore what gives being simply has no substantial form - this does not follow, but is a fallacy of the consequent; for it is possible to have ‘being simply’ in this way through one substantial form and yet to lack the ‘being simply’ that another substantial form is of a nature to give.

266. The other argument, about being in place [n.184], brings in, as it seems, another difficulty. However, a response about change of place and change of alteration can easily be given through the same fact, that everything changeable in alteration, or by transference through some form presupposed to the change, is located in place; because quantity necessarily precedes each of these changes. But what is generated, that is, what is subject to generation, is not per se located in place, either by what is subject to generation or by another form that it has through generation. For although the subject of generation in act would possess substantial form and even some quantity (which is the reason of being in place), yet it does not have quantity as quantity is the subject of generation; because quantity is not the idea of receiving the term of this change. And so I say universally that the subject of generation, as it is per se the subject of generation, does not include anything that is per se the idea of being in place, because it is nothing but substance alone - even though quantity accompany it, yet the quantity is not anything of it per se insofar as it is subject to generation.

267. And if you ask how that which is changed with the change of increase is in place - although this doubt is not necessary for the present purpose, yet I reply thatquantity or quantum, according to some, is presupposed in the change of increase and decrease; and this or that sort of term of quantity is the term of this or that change.

268. But against this: in the case of increase and decrease no quantity remains through the whole change or under either term of it, and the subject does remain the same; therefore, a quantum is not the subject of this change. And besides, of what genus is the term the per se species? If of the genus of quantity, the term is quantity; if not, the change will not be per se to quantity.

269. I say, therefore, that just as in the case of a subject of alteration, although it is under quantity during the whole alteration, yet one should not say that a quality is the subject of alteration (because the quality is accidental to what is the subject of alteration), so too in the case of a subject of increase, although it is always a quantum while it is being increased yet, from the fact that it varies in quantity (as a subject of alteration varies in quality), the quantity is not the idea nor the per se condition of the subject of increase.

270. So why?

Just as the subject per se of alteration is a being in act as to prior forms of quality yet is not a being in act as to quality, so the per se subject of increase is some being in act as to some prior form of quantity, yet it is not per se a being in act as to quantity; and the prior form is nothing but a substantial one. Therefore, the per se subject of increase and decrease is nothing but substance alone.

271. How then is the subject that there changes in place?

I reply: as a universal fact, the subject of any change is in place either through a form previously acquired in the changeable thing changed by such change, or through a form according to which the changeable thing is in flux or changes; and the first alternative is true of alteration and transfer, and the second is true of increase and decrease.

272. But that which is the subject of generation is not in place in either way; for neither is anything that is the idea of being in place presupposed to change in the subject, nor is that according to which the subject is in flux the idea of being in place.

γ. To the Third Reason

273. To the third reason, about predication [n.185], I reply that, prima facie, it does seem that the predicate taken from a posterior form is not said per se of that which is taken from a prior form, just as this statement is not per se ‘man is white’ or ‘a surface is colored’. And from this one cannot get more than that this statement is not per se ‘animal is man’.

274. And if you object that the same holds conversely, for this statement is not per se ‘a colored thing is a thing with a surface’, I reply that ‘what is taken precisely from a prior form’ and ‘what is taken precisely from a posterior form’ are so disposed that neither is per se included in the other; so the prediction is not per se, just as not conversely either. Now when one posits that the genus is taken from the prior form and the difference from the posterior form, one must conclude that the genus is not predicated per se of the difference nor conversely - which I concede. But it does not follow that the genus is not predicated per se of the species, because the species, although it imports the ultimate difference as concerns what is principal in its idea, yet does not import it precisely, but imports along with it the idea of the genus as belonging to its per se concept.

275. And if finally you object that neither is this statement per se, ‘a colored thing with a surface has a surface’, where however the understanding of the prior and of the posterior are not taken precisely as they are distinguished from each other, but the understanding of the posterior is taken as it includes the prior, comparing it with the understanding of the prior taken in itself - I reply that if this is true it is so for this reason, that the subject ‘a colored thing with a surface’ does not have a concept that is per se one, and what is not per se in itself does not seem to be per se one for anything. But it is not so in the other case, because the concept of the prior and of the posterior do make a concept that is per se one.

276. And if you ask ‘why here more than there’? - I reply:

Just as there is no question as to why a one is made from act and potency, from Metaphysics 8.6.1045a23-25, b17-21, for there is no reason other than that this is per se act and that is per se potency, so there is no cause as to why from this act and this potency a per se one comes to be (whether in things or in concepts) other than that this is potential with respect to that and that actual with respect to this, and that of this fact further there is no reason other than that this is this and that is that.

277. And in the same way about what is one per accidens: because this is this and that is that for the reason that this is act per accidens and that is potency per accidens, and, further, that for this reason does a one per accidens come to be from this and that; for it is more immediate that heat constitutes a hot thing and humanity a man (and consequently heat constitutes a being per accidens and humanity a being per se) than that a hot thing heats; yet this second one is immediate, and to seek a middle term for it is a sign of lack of education, from Metaphysics 4.4.1006a5-8, 6.1011a8-13.

δ. To the Fourth Reason

278. To the fourth reason [n.186] I say that it gives good evidence against the second rejected opinion [nn.207-230]. For in vain would corporeity be posited as different from the intellective soul if the intellective soul include the vegetative and sensitive soul, and the sensitive and vegetative soul include corporeity.

279. But as to this other way [sc. the first, of Aquinas and Giles], there is an easy response. For here there is a necessity to posit more things. And the necessity is? - That which is the reason universally for distinguishing this from that, namely contradiction, which is the immediate reason for distinguishing many things under being, to wit if this and that have a contradiction in being, because then, if this is and that is not, they are not the same in being.

280. So it is in the issue at hand: when the form of the soul does not remain, the body does remain. And so it is universally necessary to posit in any animate thing that the form by which the body is body is different from the form by which it is animate. I am not speaking of the form by which a body is a body, that is, an individual body as body is a genus, for any individual is, by its form of this sort, a body as body is a genus, and is possessed of corporeity. Rather I am speaking of body as it is the other part of the composite, for by this it is not an individual or a species in the genus of body, or indeed in the genus of substance either (which is a superior genus); but it is so only by reduction. Hence since the body, which is the other part of the composite, remains indeed in its own being without the soul, it consequently has a from by which it is a body in this way and does not have a soul; and so this form is necessarily other than the soul. But it is not an individual in the genus of body, save only by reduction, as a part; just as neither is the separate soul per se under the genus of substance but only by reduction.

281. Against this: a necessary disposition does not remain without that for which it is necessarily disposed; but the form of the mixture [sc. of the body] is a necessary disposition for the soul;     therefore etc     . And there is a special confirmation in the issue at hand, because the intellective soul even in death, since it is immortal, is not necessarily separated from matter save because another substantial form (which it requires as a necessary disposition) is separated; for the soul does not in itself have anything in matter that is repugnant to it; but the necessarily required form can only be the form of the mixture; therefore the intellective soul cannot exist without it.

282. I reply: some qualities follow the form of the mixture and are in some degree necessary so that the form of the mixture remain in the subject; and they are necessary in the subject in the same degree, so that the intellective soul remain, because whatever is necessary for the disposition is necessary for the form for which the disposition disposes; but those qualities can well be necessary simply for the intellective soul as it forms the body, and required for it in a more perfect degree than they are required for the form of the mixture. For it is possible that a more perfect form requires what a more imperfect form requires, and not only in equal degree but in a more perfect degree. Therefore when those dispositions are destroyed in the degree to which they are necessarily required for the intellective soul, the intellective soul does not remain, and yet the other disposing form can remain, because the dispositions are not corrupted in the degree necessary for that other form; but this other also does not remain in perfect and undisturbed being, because the qualities consequent to it are corrupted in the degree to which, in perfect and undisturbed being, they follow it. And therefore no mixed body able to be ensouled has being simply perfect and undisturbed when the soul departs; rather it is at once in a continual tendency toward its dissolution into the elements.

283. To the form of the argument therefore [n.281] I say that the form of the mixture is not a necessary disposition for the intellective soul; and although the intellective soul immediately follow it in generation, this is not because of a necessity between them, but because the superior agent has as passive subject a proportioned composite, namely one made of matter and the form of the mixture; and when it has a proportioned passive subject it at once introduces into it the form of which the subject is capable.

284. As to what is also added in confirmation [n.281], that the intellective soul does not have in matter any repugnance to itself, I say that there is no substantial form that in-forms matter without the consequent qualities following it, or without it requiring them, and in a certain degree - a degree in which the form, if they do not remain, will not in-form the matter. Although therefore the intellective soul not have a repugnance properly to any natural form, yet when it in-forms matter it requires some qualities, and requires them in some perfect degree, in which it will, if they do not remain, not in-form the matter. Now these are the qualities consequent to the prior form, but not necessarily required for the being of that prior form in as a great a degree as they are required for the being of the intellective soul in matter. This is plain from an example, because for animation by the intellective soul there is required a heart and a liver of a determinate hotness, a brain of a determinate coldness, and so on about the individual organic parts; but when such a disposition ceases, there can still remain some species or quality which stands along with the form of the mixture, although not the one that is required for the being and operation in matter of the intellective soul.